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Living in complex social structures, humans have evolved a unique aptitude for mentalizing:  27 
trying to understand and predict the behaviour of others.  To date, little is known about how 28 
mentalizing interacts with other cognitive processes. “Sense of agency” refers to the feeling of 29 
control over the outcomes of one’s actions, providing a precursor of responsibility. Here, we test 30 
a model of how social context influences this key feature of human action, even when action 31 
outcomes are not specifically social. We propose that in social contexts, sense of agency is 32 
affected by the requirement to mentalize, increasing the complexity of individual decision-33 
making. We test this hypothesis by comparing two situations, in which participants could either 34 
consider potential actions of another person (another participant acting to influence the task), or 35 
potential failures of a causal mechanism (a mechanical device breaking down and thereby 36 
influencing the task). For relatively good outcomes, we find an agency-reducing effect of external 37 
influence only in the social condition, suggesting that the presence of another intentional agent 38 
has a unique influence on the cognitive processes underlying one’s own voluntary action. In a 39 
second experiment, we show that the presence of another potential agent reduces sense of agency 40 
both in a context of varying financial gains or of losses. This clearly dissociates social 41 
modulation of sense of agency from classical self-serving bias. Previous work primarily focused 42 
on social facilitation of human cognition. However, when people must incorporate potential 43 
actions of others into their decision-making, we show that the resulting socio-cognitive processes 44 
reduce the individuals’ feelings of control. 45 
 46 





Humans live in highly complex cooperative social structures, a fact that is linked to the 50 
development of sophisticated mentalizing skills during recent evolution (Hare, 2011). 51 
Mentalizing can be defined as the cognitive processes associated with trying to understand and 52 
predict the behaviour of another agent in a social interaction. The evolution of the human brain 53 
appears directly driven by the need for such complex social cognition, with a wide-ranging 54 
network of neural structures (medial prefrontal cortex; temporo-parietal junction; temporal poles; 55 
precuneus) supporting mentalizing processes (Schurz et al., 2014). This would suggest that the 56 
mentalizing processes underlying social interaction have shaped other, non-social cognitive 57 
processes (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). In that case, consistent and characteristic interactions 58 
between mentalizing and non-social cognition should exist. However, the tasks used in much 59 
previous research on this topic often assumed this interaction, rather than directly test it – often 60 
requiring social cognition as an explicit element of the task. For example, when participants need 61 
to learn to predict another agent’s behaviour, mentalizing is indeed related to better performance 62 
(Devaine et al., 2014).  63 
 64 
Despite its generally adaptive value, we suggest that, in some contexts, mentalizing may have a 65 
deleterious effect on cognition and behaviour. A troubling example of how social context can 66 
impact individuals’ behaviour is the “bystander effect” (Darley and Latane, 1968), in which the 67 
presence of other people reduces the likelihood that any one individual will act in an emergency 68 
situation, like someone needing help. This effect has been linked to the phenomenon of diffusion 69 
of responsibility (Bandura, 1991), whereby people feel less responsible for their own actions in 70 
4 
 
social contexts. We recently proposed that these effects are due to mentalizing processes 71 
interfering with decision-making and sense of agency (Beyer et al., 2017).  72 
 73 
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of our actions and their outcomes, and is 74 
essential for attribution of responsibility (Frith & Haggard, 2018). Sense of agency is an essential 75 
feature of normal human behaviour, and has wide structuring effects on cognitive processes, from 76 
perception (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) to outcome evaluation (Bednark & Franz, 2014). It is 77 
understood as arising from monitoring one’s own volitional control over a physical event. Models 78 
of motor control (Blakemore et al., 2002) have highlighted a role for detecting mismatches in the 79 
comparison between internal predictions of sensory feedback, given efferent motor commands, 80 
with observed sensory feedback. Recent frameworks have emphasised an integration of such 81 
sensory-motor signals with other relevant cues, such as contextual information, or information 82 
about the decision-making process (Chambon et al., 2014; Synofzik et al., 2013). Traditionally, 83 
sense of agency is measured as a non-social aspect of cognition, which depends on action-84 
outcome contingencies in interactions of the individual with their environment (Wen, 2019). Yet, 85 
navigating the social world raises particular opportunities and challenges for individual agency.  86 
 87 
Social contexts offer the opportunity of expanding one’s agency by acting together with, or 88 
through, other agents. This can be supported by socio-cognitive processes, such as reflective 89 
mentalizing, or automatic mimicry. Interestingly, another view, akin to models of motor control, 90 
conceptualises social interaction as a feedback loop, between one’s own actions and outcomes 91 
and that of other agents, which would serve to facilitate coordination, as well allow assessing 92 
one’s control over the interaction partner (Wolpert et al., 2003). Yet, while this model addresses 93 
how one may come to feel a sense of control over the interaction partner’s actions, it does not 94 
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address the question of how the interaction partner affects one’s own sense of agency over non-95 
social, environmental consequences of one’s own behaviour. In fact, social interactions can also 96 
present challenges to monitoring one’s own agency. Namely, they can introduce ambiguity as to 97 
which of two or more potential agents caused a given event. Several studies have tested the effect 98 
of social interaction on sense of agency, particularly in joint action (Bolt et al., 2016), or in 99 
situations in which control over events is objectively shared between participants (Li et al., 2011). 100 
Using experimental designs that prevent such ambiguity as to who caused a given outcome, our 101 
work has demonstrated a different challenge to sense of agency, as social contexts can also 102 
increase the complexity of individual decision-making (Beyer et al., 2017, 2018). 103 
 104 
Previously, we have shown that the mere presence of another potential agent alters decision-105 
making, and reduces sense of agency and outcome monitoring (Beyer et al., 2017). Interestingly, 106 
this agency-reducing effect of social context was associated with increased activation of the 107 
precuneus (Beyer et al., 2018), a key node in the mentalizing network. This supports the 108 
hypothesis of strong interactions between mentalizing and wider cognition. Based on these 109 
findings, we developed a cognitive model (Figure 1) of how social context influences sense of 110 
agency (Beyer et al., 2017, 2018). This model states that in social contexts, mentalizing interferes 111 
with decision-making processes, as the potential actions of other agents must also be considered, 112 
thereby reducing sense of agency. This model draws on previous work showing that sense of 113 
agency is reduced by dysfluency in action selection (Sidarus et al., 2013, 2017a; Sidarus & 114 
Haggard, 2016) and increased cognitive load (Hon et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2016; Wen et al., 115 
2016). Here, we further investigate this framework of how social settings may influence human 116 






Figure 1: model of social context influences on sense of agency. (from Beyer, Sidarus et al., 121 
2017) The model shows the proposed mechanism behind how the presence of other people can 122 
reduce outcome monitoring and sense of agency (shown in red). We propose that in social 123 
contexts, mentalizing processes increase dysfluency in the individual’s decision-making and 124 
action planning process. This dysfluency leads to a subjective loss of control over the outcomes 125 
of the individual’s own actions. Importantly, we have previously shown that this process is 126 
independent of post-hoc reinterpretation or justification of action and outcomes, and of ambiguity 127 
about the author of a given event (shown in dashed black lines). 128 
 129 
To test the modulation of sense of agency in social and non-social contexts, we designed a task in 130 
which participants allegedly interacted with another person, while preserving their objective 131 
control over the outcomes of their own actions. In this task, participants made costly actions to 132 
avoid a negative event, such as an inflating balloon bursting, as shown in figure 2. In order to 133 
mimic the payoff structure of classical bystander scenarios, in which actions such as helping are 134 
effortful but necessary, we designed actions to be costly (result in the loss of monetary points), 135 
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but not acting – and letting the balloon burst – was even more costly. Importantly, participants 136 
had some control over the outcomes of their actions, as they lost fewer points, on average, the 137 
later they stopped the balloon. Yet, there was also risk involved in the decision, as the balloon 138 
could inflate at different rates across the trials, and could suddenly speed up during the trial. 139 
 140 
 141 
Figure 2: task outline to study social context effects on sense of agency in Experiment 1. 142 
Figure shows the different conditions for the task, similarly to previous studies Co-player absent 143 
context: participant successfully stops the balloon and loses the respective number of points (A); 144 
balloon pops, participant loses larger number of points (B). Co-player present condition: 145 
participant successfully stops the balloon and loses the respective number of points (C); co-player 146 
stops the balloon, participant loses 0 points (D); balloon pops, participant loses larger number of 147 
points (E). Analyses focused on trial types A and C. 148 
  149 
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As shown in figure 2, in some trials, participants played alone, and should decide when to act to 150 
stop the balloon inflating before it burst, weighing the potential risk costs and against the benefits 151 
of acting later. In other trials, participants were told that they were playing with another person, 152 
represented on the screen as a second avatar. In those trials, if the co-player acted first to stop the 153 
balloon, the participant no longer needed to act and hence would not lose any points. However, if 154 
neither player acted, both participants lost a large number of points. Crucially, immediate action 155 
feedback – highlighting the avatar of the actor and the stopped balloon – eliminated ambiguity as 156 
to who was the author of a given outcome. Nevertheless, when the other player was present, 157 
participants’ behaviour changed, as they tended to act later to stop the balloon, reported a reduced 158 
sense of agency over the outcomes of their own actions, and showed reduced outcome monitoring 159 
at the neural level (Beyer et al., 2017). 160 
 161 
Importantly, our cognitive model of the impact of social context on sense of agency (Beyer et al., 162 
2017, 2018) generates clear, testable hypotheses, which had remained untested and are addressed 163 
in the current study. Specifically, if sense of agency is reduced in social contexts due to 164 
mentalizing processes interfering with decision-making, then this effect should: 165 
1. Depend on the social nature of the task, wherein the possible behaviour of other agents 166 
will be actively considered during decision-making. A non-social context that merely 167 
increases uncertainty about upcoming events should not have the same effect. 168 
2. Be independent of outcome valence. Our model assumes that reduced sense of agency is 169 
the result of cognitive processes during action selection, rather than of post-hoc evaluation 170 
of action outcomes 171 
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The current experiments are therefore designed to directly test these hypotheses, to exclude key 172 
alternative explanations, while also testing the replicability and generalizability of our previous 173 
findings. 174 
 175 
Most importantly, our previous studies lacked a non-social control, so the only influence on 176 
participants’ decisions was a social agent. This meant that social modulation of sense of agency 177 
could not be distinguished from a general effect of uncertainty on sense of agency, or a more 178 
general change in the perceived risk in the trial, since the social context offered the possibility 179 
that not acting could result in a good outcome (i.e. as the balloon could be stopped by the co-180 
player). To address this, the first experiment involves two setups that are identical in terms of the 181 
events that participants experience, but differ in their instructions. Namely, one group of 182 
participants receive instructions that any external influence on the task is caused by another 183 
person. The other group is instructed that any influence is caused by a faulty mechanical device – 184 
an "old" balloon pump that can malfunction and stop inflating the balloon. Playing with another 185 
person is expected to lead participants to mentalize about the co-player’s behaviour, trying to 186 
understand and predict when the co-player will act, and incorporating such predictions in their 187 
decision-making, in addition to the risk calculations. In contrast, while the faulty pump condition 188 
still introduces uncertainty about upcoming events, and could potentially alter the risk 189 
calculations, it is not expected to engage additional cognitive processes for modelling and 190 
predicting when the pump will fail to inflate the balloon. This allows for a direct test of the 191 
influence of social cognition on sense of agency. 192 
 193 
While the above setup tests the most important alternative explanation for our previous findings, 194 
still another potential influence remains in the tasks used previously. So far, our studies only 195 
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involved negative action outcomes, thus we could not exclude the possibility that there was 196 
something specific about negative outcomes in social contexts. Generally, participants may be 197 
motivated to reduce their personal sense of agency for negative events, in line with the concept of 198 
self-serving bias (Bandura, 2002). Yet, even in the presence of a self-serving bias, one could 199 
hypothesise different patterns of interaction between social context and outcome value, depicted 200 
in Figure 3, that carry different implications for the role of self-serving bias in understanding 201 
diffusion of responsibility. Here, outcome value is considered in a relative sense, represented by a 202 
Z-score, where 0 represents average outcomes, and more positive vs. negative values represent 203 
increasingly better vs. worse than average outcomes, respectively. Classically, it has been 204 
assumed that the diffusion of responsibility effect is specifically tied to a self-serving bias, as the 205 
presence of another agent would offer an opportunity to strategically displace responsibility, 206 
away from the self and towards the other, for undesirable outcomes. Within the context of our 207 
task, this hypothesis would predict that agency ratings should be especially reduced in the social, 208 
relative to non-social, context for worse outcomes – as depicted under H1 (figure 3). In contrast, 209 
our previous studies have shown that participants demonstrated a general self-serving bias, 210 
giving gradually lower agency ratings with increasingly undesirable (more negative) outcomes 211 
(Beyer et al., 2017, 2018), but this effect was the same across social and non-social contexts – as 212 
depicted under H2. This suggests that diffusion of responsibility is an independent effect that 213 
cannot be explained by a self-serving bias. Finally, one could hypothesise a third pattern of 214 
results, H3, wherein the reduction in agency ratings due to a social context would only be evident 215 
for more desirable outcomes. In such a scenario, particularly low agency ratings for relatively bad 216 
outcomes might result in a floor effect, obscuring the influence of social context. Importantly, 217 
results resembling those of either H2 or H3 would show that diffusion of responsibility could not 218 
be explained through a self-serving bias. Our previous work already supported H2. Yet, it 219 
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remains possible that these results were due to actions always having a (more or less) negative 220 
outcome, thus creating a situation in which displacing responsibility might be seen as favourable. 221 
Therefore, in a second experiment, we tested whether the presence of another agent reduces sense 222 
of agency similarly for overall positive vs. overall negative action outcomes. 223 
We discuss the implications of our findings for common practices of education and for our 224 
understanding of social development. 225 
 226 
 227 
Figure 3: Hypothetical interactions between self-serving bias and diffusion of responsibility. 228 
Across the 3 panels, there is an overall self-serving bias, with agency ratings gradually reducing 229 
with increasingly less desirable outcomes but each panel carries different implications. Outcome 230 
value is here standardised (Z-scored), ranging from better than average outcome values, i.e. 231 
positive Z values, to average outcomes (0), towards worse than average outcomes, i.e. 232 
increasingly negative Z scores. H1: diffusion of responsibility (i.e. lower agency ratings in social, 233 
than non-social, context) is due to a self-serving bias, as evidenced by a strategic displacement of 234 
agency with more undesirable outcomes. H2: diffusion of responsibility is independent from a 235 
self-serving bias. H3: diffusion of responsibility cannot be explained by a self-serving bias, but 236 
can be overshadowed by it. 237 
 238 
Experiment 1 239 
If people feel less in control in social action contexts because mentalizing processes interfere 240 
with decision-making, then this effect should be specific for social influences. However, if mere 241 
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uncertainty prior to the action or post-hoc counterfactual thinking leads to the subjective loss of 242 
agency, then this should also be observed for non-social sources of alternative trial outcomes.  243 
We compared the agency-reducing effect of the presence of an alternative agent between two task 244 
settings (figures 2 & 3). Both setups were identical in all aspects, except that the alternative agent 245 
was introduced either as a human co-player, or as a non-intentional and non-social mechanical 246 
device.  247 
 248 
Methods 249 
All measures, manipulations and exclusion of data for the experiments reported here are 250 
explained in the manuscript. 251 
Sample size, participants & procedure 252 
For both experiments, we based the experimental methods on previously established findings. 253 
The task we used has been shown to result in reliable, replicable within-subject effect of context 254 
(i.e. alternative agent absent vs. present; Beyer et al., 2017, 2018). Sample size was determined a 255 
priori based on previous studies, aiming for N=24 per group, and constrained by participant 256 
availability.  We planned to test the main effects of interest on agency ratings using multilevel 257 
regression models, given their greater sensitivity and reliability relative to standard statistical 258 
tests (e.g. ANOVAs) that do not simultaneously model variability in effects across and within 259 
participants (Gelman & Hill, 2006; McElreath, 2015). Unfortunately, it remains difficult to 260 
perform classic power calculations for multilevel regression models, due to the heterogeneous 261 
sources of variance that must be taken into account (McElreath, 2015; Westfall et al., 2014). 262 
Therefore, we opted to analyse agency ratings using a Bayesian approach to multilevel 263 
regression. Bayesian methods thus allow us to assess the strength of evidence in our data for the 264 
effects of interest, given our sample size. 265 
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48 healthy volunteers (9 male; age 18-31, mean age = 23; 4 left-handed) were recruited for 266 
experiment 1. 24 participants (3 male) performed the task in the social condition, 24 (6 male) 267 
performed the task in the non-social condition. No participants were excluded from data analysis. 268 
For the social version, participants were invited into the lab in pairs, received instructions 269 
together and were told that they would be playing together in the experiment. They were then 270 
brought into separate computer cubicles to perform the task. For the non-social version, 271 
participants were also recruited in pairs, but were not told they would be playing together. In case 272 
one participant failed to attend, the other was assigned to the non-social condition and tested 273 
alone (n=9). After the task, participants filled out a post-experimental questionnaire, were fully 274 
debriefed and paid £7.50 per hour for their participation, plus a bonus based on their task 275 
performance. All participants gave written informed consent and the study was approved by the 276 
local ethics committee. 277 
 278 
Task 279 
The task was similar to that used in (Beyer et al., 2018) and modelled after the balloon analogue 280 
risk task (Lejuez et al., 2002). In each trial, participants saw a small balloon in the centre of the 281 
computer screen, which inflated at constant speed. The image of a pin was presented above the 282 
balloon, such that the balloon would pop when it touched the pin. The balloon would inflate at 283 
variable speed and speed up unpredictably at some point of a given trial, in order to make it risky 284 
to wait until the maximum size possible.  At any time, participants could stop the balloon by 285 
pressing the space bar on a standard keyboard. 286 
 287 
In the social version (figure 1), an avatar marked the presence or absence of the alternative agent. 288 
To the left of the balloon, the participant saw an avatar representing themselves. To the right of 289 
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the balloon, the participant saw either a coloured rectangle (in non-social trials), or another avatar 290 
representing their alleged co-player (in social trials). In social trials, the co-player could 291 
sometimes stop the balloon before, and thus instead of, the participant. In each trial, the avatar 292 
belonging to the player who stopped the balloon was marked by a red rectangle as soon as a 293 
response was made. 294 
 295 
In the non-social version (figure 4), participants saw the image of an air pump that was coloured 296 
either green or blue. Participants were instructed that the green pump was new, and the blue 297 
pump was old. The green pump would always inflate the balloon until it popped, unless the 298 
participant acted. The blue pump might, on some trials, break down before the balloon was fully 299 
inflated, in which case the participant would not lose any points. 300 
 301 
Critically, the social "co-player" and the non-social "faulty pump" were programmed in the same 302 
way: the alternative agent would only act if the participant had acted on the majority of social/old 303 
pump trials and for a maximum of 3 trials per block. The only difference between task versions 304 
was that the pump was introduced as a non-social agent, thus not encouraging the engagement of 305 





Figure 4: task outline for non-social frame in experiment 1. Figure shows the different 309 
conditions for the non-social task version. Within-subject conditions and outcomes were identical 310 
to the social task version shown in figure 2. 311 
 312 
The payoff structure was as follows: if the balloon popped, participants lost 80-99 points (and the 313 
social group was told that, in social trials, so would their co-player); if they stopped the balloon, 314 
they lost 1-60 points; in trials with the alternative agent, if that agent stopped the balloon, 315 
participants lost 0 points. The other agent (co-player / old pump) was programmed to stop the 316 
balloon with a likelihood of about 70%, if the participant had acted on the majority of social 317 
trials, and for a maximum of 3 trials per block. The point at which the co-player acted / the old 318 




Participants completed three blocks of 20 trials each with 10 agent absent (co-player absent / new 321 
pump) and 10 agent present (co-player present / old pump) trials per block, randomized on a trial-322 
wise basis. 323 
After the last block, participants in the social group were given the following questions, 324 
answering on visual analogue scales: ‘How fair was your co-player’ (scale labelled as ‘very 325 
unfair’ / ‘very fair’); 'When you played together with your co-player, in what percentage of trials 326 
did the balloon pop?' (0% / 100%); 'When you played together with your co-player, in what 327 
percentage of trials did YOU stop the balloon?'; 'When you played alone, in what percentage of 328 
trials did you stop the balloon?'; 'When you played with your co-player, did you believe you were 329 
really playing with him/her?' (‘Not at all’ / ‘Completely’). Participants in the non-social group 330 
were only given questions 2-4, re-phrased in regard to the old/new pump instead of the co-player. 331 
Data analysis 332 
Our analysis focused on agency ratings in trials in which the participant successfully stopped the 333 
balloon before it burst, as these trials are comparable between contexts in which the alternative 334 
agent (co-player or old pump) was present or absent.  335 
 336 
Analyses were performed with Bayesian multilevel linear regression models (a.k.a. mixed-effects 337 
models), with the brms package (Bürkner, 2017) in R (R Development Core Team, 2008), which 338 
uses Hamiltonian Monte Carlo to sample from the posterior distribution over parameter values, 339 
by means of the Stan programming language (Carpenter et al., 2017). We report the posterior 340 
means (b) of the estimated parameters at the population-level (fixed effects), and their associated 341 
95% credible intervals (CI; the central 95% of values in the respective marginal posterior 342 
distribution, indicating the uncertainty around the estimate). We entered trial-wise agency ratings 343 
as the dependent variable, modelled by group (social = .5 vs. non-social = -.5) as a between-344 
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subject predictor, with alternative agent context (absent = .5 vs. present = -.5) and outcome value 345 
(Z-scored within participant; (Gelman, 2008) as within-subject predictors. The within subject 346 
predictors were included as variable effects nested within participants (i.e. random intercepts and 347 
slopes model).  In a previous study using this paradigm (Beyer, Sidarus et al 2017), we 348 
consistently found regression slopes of less than 5 points. Therefore, we specified the prior for 349 
the population-level effects a b ~ Normal(0, 5) – that is, Normally distributed with a mean of 0 350 
and standard deviation of 5. This reflects that we are ~95% certain that regression slopes will be 351 
within the interval [-10, +10]. We set a Uniform(0, 100) prior on the intercept parameter, 352 
covering the range of the scale. We calculated Bayes Factors (BF) for each regression term using 353 
the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Wagenmakers et al., 2010). As appropriate, we report effects in 354 
favour of the null hypothesis (BF01), or in favour of the alternative hypothesis (BF10 = 1/BF01, 355 
and following (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014), we describe the strength of evidence as anecdotal (1 356 
< BF < 3), moderate (3 < BF < 10), strong (10 < BF < 30) and very strong (30 < BF). 357 
 358 
Results 359 
Influence of social context on task performance 360 
Comparing task performance between task versions showed, most importantly, no difference 361 
between social (avatar) and non-social (pump) agent groups in the number of trials in which the 362 
alternative agent acted (M = 7.6 / 7.5; SD = 1.6 / 1.6; t46 = 0.4, p = .656; d=.06; Figure 5A). Thus, 363 
participants in the social and non-social versions experienced the same level of external influence 364 
and, in principle, could have formed similar expectations about the probability of the balloon 365 




Considering the number of trials in which the participant did act, a group by context mixed 368 
ANOVA showed significant main effects of group (F1,46 = 8.0; p = .007, ηp
2 = .15), context (F1,46 369 
= 236.3; p < .001, ηp
2 = .84), and a significant interaction (F1,46 = 5.6; p = .023, ηp
2 = .11). Post-370 
hoc tests revealed that, when the alternative agent was present, participants in the social task 371 
frame acted less frequently than participants in the non-social frame (M = 16.3 / 19.2; SD = 3.3 / 372 
3.0; t46 = -3.2; p = .002; d = .92), while there was no difference between groups when the 373 
alternative agent was absent (M = 24.6 / 25.3; SD = 2.5 / 1.9; t46 = -1.0; p = .304; d = .32; Figure 374 
5B). While, as is to be expected, both groups acted less often when the balloon could be stopped 375 
by the alternative agent (paired t-test for agent present vs. absent, social frame: t23 = 11.7, p < 376 
.001; d = 2.78; non-social frame: t23 = 10.0, p < .001; d = 2.32), this effect was stronger if 377 
participants thought they were playing with another person, than if they were playing with a 378 
faulty pump. Thus, even though they had the same experience of external influence on stopping 379 
the balloon, participants who believed the alternative agent in that condition to be another person 380 
relied more on the other agent to act, relative to participants who did not believe that another 381 
person was involved. Since both groups had the same number of trials in which the alternative 382 
agent acted, acting less often in the agent present condition for the social frame group resulted in 383 
a larger number of balloon bursts trials, and hence a slightly inferior task performance, with a 384 
lower gain on average (points gained in the social vs. non-social groups: M = 46.6 / 70.6; SD = 385 





Figure 5: task performance. Panel A shows the mean number of "actions" by the alternative 389 
agent, i.e. when co-player acts (social group), or old pump breaks down (non-social group). Panel 390 
B shows the mean number of successful actions by the participant in both experimental groups, 391 
as a function of the context (agent absent vs. present). 392 
 393 
We analysed response times (RTs) with a group (social and non-social groups) x context (agent 394 
absent vs. present) mixed ANOVA. This revealed no significant main effect of group (F1,46 = 0.9; 395 
p = .358, ηp
2 = . 02) or context (F1,46 = 1.9; p = .197, ηp
2 = .04), nor a significant interaction (F1,46 396 
= 1.2; p = .285, ηp
2 = .03; agent absent vs. present for social group: M = 6.35 / 6.33; SD = .22 / 397 
.30; agent absent vs. present for non-social group: M = 6.33 / 6.23; SD = .21 / .29). The absence 398 
of any effect on RTs in this experiment suggests that changes in its design and the way the 399 
behaviour of the alternative agent was programmed, relative to our previous study (Beyer et al., 400 
2017), may have reduced the variance in RTs. Nonetheless, the increased number of balloon 401 
bursts in the presence of the social agent clearly demonstrates that participants tended to wait for 402 
the other player to act. 403 
 404 
Influence of social context on sense of agency 405 
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Our analyses focused on trials in which the participant stopped the balloon. For these trials, event 406 
sequences and action-outcome contingencies were identical in the alternative agent absent vs. 407 
present contexts. The Bayesian multilevel regression model of agency ratings (figure 6) showed 408 
very strong evidence for a main effect of outcome value (b = 8.95, 95% CI = [5.55, 12.12], BF10 409 
> 4×104). Importantly, there was moderate evidence for a group × context × outcome interaction 410 
(b = 6.01, 95% CI = [0.73, 11.26], BF10 = 6.04; figure 6; full statistics in table 1), suggesting that 411 





Figure 6: Influences on sense of agency in experiment 1. Density plots of the posterior fixed 417 
effects estimates from the Bayesian multilevel model. Points show posterior means, and 418 
horizontal lines are 95% Credible Intervals. ‘Group’ refers to the social (avatar) vs. non-social 419 
(pump) factor. ‘Context’ refers to the presence or absence of the alternative agent (i.e. co-player 420 





Table 1: Test statistics for experiment 1. Estimated fixed effect parameters from the Bayesian 424 
multilevel model. Columns show the posterior mean estimate, standard error, lower and upper bounds of 425 
the 95% Credible Interval, and Bayes Factors in favour of the null (BF01) and alternative (BF10) 426 
hypotheses. Group: Social vs. Non-social, Context: presence vs. absence of the alternative agent (i.e. co-427 
player present/absent, pump old/new). 428 
 429 
 430 
Parameter Estimate SE 2.5% 97.5% BF01 BF10 
Intercept 61.32 2.85 55.68 67.00 - - 
Group -2.69 3.93 -10.22 5.28 0.87 1.15 
Context 1.36 1.12 -0.84 3.57 2.04 0.49 
Outcome 8.95 1.70 5.55 12.12 <2.5e-4  >4 e4 
Group x Context 2.96 2.02 -1.04 6.88 0.85 1.18 
Group x Outcome 1.19 2.98 -4.60 7.03 1.57 0.64 
Context x Outcome 1.20 1.47 -1.62 4.06 2.38 0.42 
Group x Context x Outcome 6.01 2.71 0.73 11.26 0.17 6.04 
Social Group:       
Context 2.84 1.54 -0.23 5.83 0.61 1.63 
Outcome 9.55 2.24 5.15 13.99 < 2.5×10-4  > 4 ×103 
Context x Outcome 4.20 2.09 0.21 8.32 0.34 2.97 
Non-Social Group:       
Context -0.12 1.48 -3.07 2.85 3.83 0.26 
Outcome 8.35 2.28 3.67 12.71 < 0.01 291.42 
Context x Outcome -1.80 1.91 -5.46 2.02 1.72 0.58 
  431 
To investigate the three-way interaction, we used our model to estimate the size of the context by 432 
outcome interaction within each group (Figure 7). In the social group, we found a context by 433 
outcome interaction (b = 4.20, 95% CI = [0.21, 8.32]), with anecdotal evidence for the alternative 434 
hypothesis (BF10 = 2.97). In the social group, agency ratings were increasingly greater in the 435 
agent-absent context compared to the agent-present context (in which the alleged co-player could 436 
have acted) with better outcomes. This interaction resulted in anecdotal evidence for a main 437 
effect of context (b = 2.84, 95% CI = [-0.23, 5.83]; BF10 = 1.63), for average outcomes. That is, 438 
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the previously observed effect of a reduction in agency ratings in social contexts was here largely 439 
restricted to good outcomes, likely due to bad outcomes already leading to a robust reduction in 440 
agency ratings, thus overshadowing the context effects.  441 
 442 
In contrast, the non-social group showed no robust context by outcome interaction (b = -1.80, 443 
95% CI = [-5.46, 2.02]), with anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis (BF01 = 1.72), nor a 444 
main effect of context (b = -0.12, 95% CI = [-3.07, 2.85]), with moderate evidence for the null 445 
hypothesis (BF01 = 3. 38). Thus, in contrast to the social group, and to our previous findings, the 446 
presence or absence of another possible cause for stopping the balloon, i.e. the old vs. new pump, 447 
did not robustly affect agency ratings.  448 
 449 
Consistent with the large main effect of outcome value in the full model, both groups showed 450 
very strong evidence for a main effect of outcome (see table 1), with better outcomes linked to 451 
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 454 
Figure 7: results for separate analysis of social and non-social groups. Panel A shows 455 
smoothed density plots of the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters for the effects of 456 
context and outcome estimated for the social and non-social group separately. Points show 457 
posterior means, and horizontal lines are 95% Credible Intervals. Panel B displays the mean 458 
agency ratings (dots) and fitted values from the model (regression line, and shaded 95% Credible 459 
Intervals) for the context (alternative agent present vs. absent) by outcome value interactions for 460 
each group. Note that more positive outcome values (Z) reflect smaller losses, and more negative 461 
values reflect larger losses. 462 
 463 
Manipulation checks 464 
At the end of the experiment, participants in the social task group were asked to rate the fairness 465 
of their co-player, and whether they had believed they were interacting with the other player, on 466 
scales from 0-100%. Participants rated their co-player as moderately fair (M = 47.6%; SD = 22.7) 467 
and showed a moderate level of belief in the cover story (M = 54.8%; SD = 35.1). An average 468 
rating of >50% indicates that participants were moderately convinced that they were interacting 469 
with the other participant. It should be noted that this rating was collected at the very end of the 470 
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task, and being given this question itself would likely arouse suspicion. Neither rating was 471 
correlated with the effect of social context on sense of agency (fairness: r = .12, p = .59; belief in 472 
cover story: r = -.06, p = .77). Given this lack of correlation, together with the demand 473 
characteristics involved in such debriefing questionnaires, which highlight the possibility of 474 
having been deceived, and our use of mixed effects models, which are robust to outliers, we 475 
decided to not exclude any participants. These questions were not given to the non-social task 476 
group, since there was no alleged other person involved. Including belief ratings a separate 477 
predictor in the model of agency ratings showed no main effect of deception, nor any robust 478 
interactions (see Supplementary Analysis). 479 
 480 
In both conditions, we assessed participants’ perception of how many times they acted in either 481 
condition. Participants were asked on what percentage of trials they stopped the balloon in social 482 
trials / when playing with the old pump. This did not differ between conditions (Msocial = 65.2; 483 
SDsocial = 14.4; Mnon-social = 65.7; SDnon-social = 18.4; t46 = -0.1; p = .911). They were also asked on 484 
what percentage of social / old pump trials the balloon burst, with participants in the social 485 
condition reporting a greater percentage of bursts than participants in the non-social condition 486 
(Msocial = 38.5; SDsocial = 18.0; Mnon-social = 27.6; SDnon-social = 19.3; t46 = 2.0; p = .05). For non-487 
social trials / playing with the new pump, there was no difference between groups in the 488 
estimated number of times participants stopped the balloon (Msocial = 77.9; SDsocial = 15.3; Mnon-489 
social = 77.5; SDnon-social = 19.4; t46 = .1; p = .943). This demonstrates that participant’s impressions 490 
of the balloon bursting were largely in line with their actual experience, as the social group 491 
experienced more bursts, as presumably they waited for the other agent to act; unlike the non-492 




Interim discussion 495 
The results of this experiment show that the reduction in sense of agency due to the presence of 496 
another potential agent occurs only when that agent is assumed to be a person (i.e. social agent), 497 
and not when it is assumed to be a mere mechanism. When a non-intentional, non-social agent 498 
could interfere with the balloon inflation in addition to the participant, no reduction in sense of 499 
agency was observed for trials in which the participant successfully acted. Participants behaved 500 
differently towards social agents, relying more on them than on a non-social agent to intervene in 501 
response to increasing risk, and to act before the balloon exploded. These findings show that 502 
social cognition is indeed a crucial factor in these contextual effects on sense of agency.  503 
 504 
Alternative explanations for reduced sense of agency in the presence of an alternative agent could 505 
have been a shift in subjective outcome value when a no-loss option was possible. Thus, due to 506 
counterfactual thinking (‘I could have lost no points’), a small negative outcome could be 507 
perceived as worse than when the no-loss option was not available (in the agent present vs. absent 508 
conditions). Further, increased uncertainty of trial outcomes prior to the action, or prior 509 
experience of non-control (i.e. the balloon stopping ‘on its own’), could become associated with 510 
the task condition, thus lowering the overall sense of agency. Crucially, these explanations would 511 
have predicted the same effect for the non-social agent, i.e. the old and faulty pump. As the only 512 
difference between the two groups was the social vs. non-social framing of why the balloon 513 
might occasionally stop "on its own", these findings strongly suggest that social cognition 514 
underlies the agency-reducing effect of the co-player’s presence.  515 
 516 
One other potential difference between conditions could be that the co-player could be perceived 517 
as a capable, somewhat predictable aid in the task, whereas the old pump was clearly labelled as 518 
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defective and random. However, if this had influenced sense of agency ratings, we would have 519 
predicted the opposite effects of those found here, i.e. participants should experience particularly 520 
low sense of agency when interacting with an unpredictable faulty device. 521 
A further difference between task conditions was the presence of a self-representation in the form 522 
of an avatar for the social task group, which was absent for the non-social task group. However, 523 
for the social group, the participant’s own avatar was present in both task conditions (co-player 524 
absent or present). Thus, if the presence of such a self-representation affected sense of agency, 525 
this should have resulted in a main effect of group, rather than the observed interaction effect. 526 
 527 
In contrast to our previous studies, in the social group here we found evidence for a context by 528 
outcome interaction effect, rather than simply a main effect of context. This was due to a stronger 529 
effect of the co-player’s presence if the outcome of a given trial was relatively good, i.e. fewer 530 
points were lost. The most likely explanation for this interaction is a floor effect in agency ratings 531 
when outcomes were particularly bad, as participants already rated their sense of agency as very 532 
low, thus not reducing it further due to the co-player’s presence. Importantly, the direction of this 533 
interaction is in the opposite direction of what would be predicted based on self-serving bias, 534 
which would predict a stronger displacement of responsibility to others for particularly bad 535 
outcomes. 536 
 537 
However, overall negative outcome valence remains a potential confound in the tasks used so far. 538 
Previous accounts of diffusion of responsibility have focused on post-hoc justification due to self-539 
serving bias (Bandura, 2002).  This predicts that external attribution of control should occur 540 
particularly for undesirable outcomes. None of our previous studies found evidence for a stronger 541 
effect of social context on sense of agency with increasingly larger losses (Beyer et al., 2017, 542 
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2018; Ciardo et al., 2020). In fact, the only interaction between social context and outcomes 543 
observed so far showed the opposite pattern, with a reduced effect of social context on sense of 544 
agency for particularly negative outcomes.  545 
 546 
However, while the effect of social context does not depend on outcome value (Z-scored), it may 547 
nevertheless be driven by overall outcome valence. Particularly, framing outcomes as generally 548 
negative could still motivate participants to assign some responsibility to their co-player in social 549 
settings, regardless of loss magnitude. As such, a social task frame may simply afford the 550 
displacement of responsibility for negative events. To test this alternative explanation, in the 551 
second experiment, we compared social context effects on sense of agency for positive and 552 
negative outcomes. 553 
 554 
Experiment 2 555 
In this experiment, one group of participants performed a “gain” version of the social task (fig. 556 
8), winning a variable amount of points, while another group performed a “loss” version, losing a 557 
variable amount of points, as in previous experiments.  558 
 559 
Methods 560 
Participants & procedure 561 
44 healthy female volunteers were recruited for experiment 2. Due to low numbers of male 562 
participants being available for testing, only female participants were recruited. 22 participants 563 
performed the task in the gain frame, 22 performed the task in the loss frame. One participant in 564 
the gain frame was excluded from the analysis due to low trial numbers (only 5 trials in which the 565 
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participant successfully stopped the balloon in the social context). Thus, data of 43 participants 566 
were included in the analysis (age 19-30, mean age = 23; 2 left-handed). 567 
Participants were invited into the lab in pairs, received instructions together and were told that 568 
they would be playing together in the experiment. They were then brought into separate computer 569 
cubicles to perform the task. After the task, participants filled out a post-experimental 570 
questionnaire, were fully debriefed and paid £7.50 for their participation, plus a bonus based on 571 
their task performance. All participants gave written informed consent, and the study was 572 
approved by the local ethics committee. 573 
 574 
Task 575 
The overall task was similar to that in experiment 1, with the exception that the payoff structure 576 
was different, as it needed to be symmetric for the loss and gain version. In the loss frame, the 577 
payoff structure was as follows: if the balloon burst, the participant lost 20 points (and was told 578 
that in social trials, so would their co-player); if the participant stopped the balloon, they lost 1-20 579 
points depending on the size of the balloon (the bigger the balloon, the fewer points they lost); in 580 
social trials, if the co-player stopped the balloon, the participant lost 0 points. In the gain frame, 581 
the payoff was as follows: if the balloon burst, the participant earned 0 points; if the participant 582 
stopped the balloon, they earned 1-20 points (the bigger the balloon, the more points they 583 
earned); in social trials, if the co-player stopped the balloon, the participant earned 20 points. 584 
Additionally, there was no pin displayed above the balloon, but the balloon popped at a randomly 585 
determined size that varied from trial to trial. At any time, the participant could press the left 586 





Figure 8: task outline for experiment 2. Figure shows the different conditions for the task in the 590 
gain frame. Task structure was identical for the loss frame, except for outcome value (which 591 
ranged from 0 to -20). In both gain and loss frames, participants obtain the best outcome when 592 
the co-player acts, and the worst outcome when the balloon bursts. 593 
 594 
Thus, in both frames, the best outcome was obtained by the co-player’s action, the worst if 595 
neither player acted, and an outcome in-between these extremes if the participant acted, 596 
depending on balloon size. Notably, the overall valence of the outcomes was framed as either 597 
something desirable (trying to gain points) or something to be avoided (losing points). 598 
At the end of each trial, participants rated how much control they felt they had over the outcome 599 
of that trial, on a visual analogue scale ranging from ‘no control’ to ‘complete control’. 600 
Participants were instructed that the outcome referred to the number of points they gained or lost 601 




The co-player’s behaviour was pre-programmed, such that they would only stop the balloon if the 604 
participant had stopped the balloon on the majority of social trials of that block (i.e. if the 605 
participant had stopped the balloon on at least one social trial more, than the co-player). If this 606 
was the case, the co-player stopped the balloon with a likelihood of about 66%. 607 
Participants played 4 blocks of 30 trials each. In each block, 15 social and 15 non-social trials 608 
were randomly intermixed, resulting in 60 trials per experimental condition. 609 
 610 
Data analysis 611 
Data analysis was performed as for experiment 1, with Bayesian multilevel linear regression 612 
models, with gain and loss frame as a between-subject factor (Gain frame = .5, Loss frame = -.5), 613 
with presence of co-player context (absent = .5, present = -.5) and outcome value (standardized to 614 
have a standard deviation of 0.5; wherein 0 represents average outcomes, and higher values 615 
meaning increasingly more desirable outcomes, i.e. more points gained or fewer points lost) as 616 
within-subject predictors. As before, the within subject factors were included as varying effects 617 
nested within participants. As in experiment 1, we placed a Normal(0, 5) prior distribution on the 618 
fixed effects for all regression parameters, and a Uniform(0, 100) prior on the intercept term. 619 
 620 
Results 621 
Task performance 622 
General task performance did not differ between groups. There was no significant difference 623 
across groups in number of trials in which the co-player acted (in the agent present condition; 624 
gain vs. loss group: M = 15.62 / 15.73; SD = 3.25 / 2.81; t41 = -0.1, p = .908; d = .04; figure 9A), 625 
and no significant difference in participants' final earnings (gain vs. loss group: M = 290 / 290; 626 
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SD = 24.3 / 21.6; t41 = 0.02, p = .983; d = 0). The number of trials in which the participant did act 627 
was analysed with a group (gain vs. loss frame) by context (agent absent vs. present) mixed 628 
ANOVA. This showed no significant effect of group (F1,41 < .1, p = .953, ηp
2 < .01), nor a 629 
significant interaction between the factors (F1,41 = .1, p = .817, ηp
2 < .01; figure 9B). A significant 630 
main effect of context (F1,41 = 221.8, p < .001, ηp
2 = .84) showed that, across groups, participants 631 
acted significantly less often when the alternative agent was present than absent, since the balloon 632 
could also be stopped by the co-player (agent absent vs. present for gain group: M = 46.4 / 30.9; 633 
SD = 6.7 / 7.2; t20 = 9.63; p < .001; d = 2.23; agent absent vs. present for loss group: M = 46.1 / 634 
31.0; SD = 5.8 / 5.9; t21 = 11.61; p < .001; d = 2.58). 635 
 636 
Figure 9: task performance for experiment 2. Figure shows mean number of the alternative 637 
agent’s actions (co-player acts), as well as mean number of successful actions of the participants 638 
in both experimental groups. 639 
 640 
Analysis of RTs with the same mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group (F1,41 641 
= 0.1; p = .759, ηp
2 < . 01), nor a significant interaction (F1,41 = 1.3; p = .267, ηp
2 = .03). A 642 
significant main effect of context (F1,41 = 27.4; p < .001, ηp
2 = .40) showed that, across both 643 
groups, participants acted significantly later in the agent present than in the agent absent 644 
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condition (agent absent vs. present for gain group: M = 6.4 / 6.7; SD = .5 / .4; agent absent vs. 645 
present for loss group: M = 6.5 / 6.7; SD = .4 / .3). Consistent with our previous findings (Beyer 646 
et al 2017), this suggests that participants tended to wait a bit longer to act when an alternative 647 
agent was present, since the best outcome was obtained if the co-player acted instead of them. 648 
Importantly, participants’ behaviour was equally affected by the co-player across gain and loss 649 
groups. 650 
 651 
Influence of outcome valence on sense of agency and its modulation by social context 652 
As before, our analyses focused on trials in which the participant stopped the balloon, in which 653 
event sequences and action-outcome contingencies were identical for trials with a co-player 654 
present vs. absent. The Bayesian multilevel regression model of agency ratings included the 655 
predictors group (gain vs. loss frame), context (co-player absent vs. present) and outcome 656 
(standardized). This revealed strong evidence for a main effect of context (b = 3.01, 95% CI = 657 
[1.09, 4.90], BF10 = 18.3), as well as strong evidence for a context × outcome interaction (b = 658 
3.50, 95% CI = [1.32, 5.66], BF10 = 24.4, and very strong evidence for a main effect of outcome 659 
value (b = 9.73, 95% CI = [6.82, 12.55], BF01 > 4×10
4); see figure 9, and full statistics in table 2).  660 
Consistent with the social group in Exp. 1 and previous findings (Beyer et al., 2017, 2018), 661 
participants felt more in control over better outcomes, and felt less in control in the social 662 
context, when a co-player was present, compared to the non-social one, when playing alone. 663 
Importantly, as for experiment 1, the interaction between outcome value and social context 664 
demonstrates that a self-serving bias, leading to a strategic displacement of agency for 665 
undesirable outcomes, cannot explain the reduction in agency ratings in the social context. As 666 
figure 10B shows, the difference in agency ratings between social and non-social context 667 




Crucially, we found anecdotal evidence against an interaction between gain/loss group and 670 
context (b = 0.87, 95% CI = [-2.65, 4.29], BF01 = 2.55), and anecdotal evidence against a group x 671 
context x outcome interaction (b = 0.76, 95% CI = [-3.41, 4. 87], BF01
 = 2.23). Finally, we found 672 
anecdotal evidence against both other effects involving the group term (main effect of group: b = 673 
-2.84, 95% CI = [-10.04, 4.34], BF01 = 1.08; group x outcome: b = -2.46, 95% CI = [-7.53, 2.71], 674 
BF01 = 1.26).  Together, these findings support our prediction that the previously observed 675 
reduction in agency ratings in the presence of intentional agents was not related to the overall 676 
context of losing money, as similar effects were observed in the context. 677 
 678 
Table 2: Test statistics for experiment 2. Estimated parameters at the population-level from the 679 
Bayesian multilevel model. Estimate is the posterior mean and SE is the posterior standard deviation, with 680 
lower and upper bounds of 95% credibility intervals. Group: Gain vs. Loss frame, Context: presence 681 
vs. absence of the alternative agent (i.e. co-player present/absent). 682 
 683 
Parameter Estimate SE 2.5% 97.5% BF01 BF10 
Intercept 58.37 2.68 52.66 63.48 - - 
Group -2.84 3.67 -10.04 4.34 1.08 0.93 
Context 3.01 0.96 1.09 4.90 0.05 18.3 
Outcome 9.73 1.47 6.82 12.55 <2.5×10-3 > 4×104 
Group x Context 0.87 1.75 -2.65 4.29 2.55 0.39 
Group x Outcome -2.46 2.62 -7.53 2.71 1.26 0.80 
Context x Outcome 3.50 1.10 1.32 5.66 0.04 24.4 
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 687 
Figure 10: Influences on sense of agency for experiment 2. A. Density plots of the posterior 688 
distributions of the estimated parameters at the population-level from the Bayesian multilevel 689 
model. Points show posterior means, and horizontal lines are 95% Credible Intervals. ‘Group’ 690 
refers to the gain vs. loss frame. ‘Context’ refers to the presence or absence of the alternative 691 
agent (i.e. co-player present/absent). B. Mean agency ratings (dots) and fitted values from the 692 
model (regression line, and shaded 95% Credible Intervals) for the context × outcome value 693 
interaction effect, collapsed across loss and gain frame groups. Note that more positive outcome 694 
values (Z) reflect smaller losses or larger gains (loss/gain group), and more negative values 695 
reflect larger losses or lower gains, respectively. 696 
 697 
Manipulation checks 698 
Ratings of fairness (M = 48.9%; SD = 17.2) and believing the cover story (M = 52.9%; SD = 699 
22.1) were similar to experiment 1 and did not differ between win/loss groups (fairness Win vs. 700 
Loss, M = 50.6 / 47.2; SD = 17.3 / 17.5; t41 = .66; p = .514; d = .20; believe Win vs. Loss, M = 701 
49.3 / 56.7; SD =  21.3 / 22.9; t41 = 1.11; p = .274; d = .33). Including belief ratings a separate 702 
predictor in the model of agency ratings showed no robust evidence for a main effect of 703 
deception, nor any interactions (see Supplementary Analysis).  704 
 705 
Interim Discussion 706 
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Our findings show that reduced sense of agency in social contexts is not limited to situations in 707 
which action outcomes are undesirable, but also occurs for overall positive outcomes. This is in 708 
line with the hypothesis that the reduction in sense of agency in social contexts is driven by 709 
mentalizing processes, rather than self-serving bias. Across gain and loss frame settings, for 710 
relatively average or good outcomes, participants felt less in control over the consequences of 711 
their own actions when another potential agent was present. Thus, reduced sense of agency in 712 
social context does not depend on a generalised motivation to displace or diffuse responsibility 713 
for negative action consequences. In fact, as seen for the social group of Exp 1, the context by 714 
outcome interaction showed that the effect of context increased with more positive outcomes. 715 
 716 
Discussion 717 
This study tested key predictions derived from our novel model on how social contexts affect an 718 
important non-social aspect of human cognition, namely the emergence of a sense of agency. In a 719 
first experiment, we showed that social context reduces sense of agency, particularly for good 720 
outcomes, but a comparable, non-social, non-intentional influence in the task did not have this 721 
effect. In a second study, we showed that the presence of another social agent led participants to 722 
feel less in control over the consequences of their actions, regardless of whether those 723 
consequences involved overall financial gains or losses. Importantly, in both cases, the alternative 724 
agent had no influence on the outcomes of the participant’s action. 725 
 726 
Our findings replicate our previous studies using similar tasks, while significantly extending our 727 
understanding of important phenomena in social psychology. Generally, differences in human 728 
behaviour between non-social and social environments are explained with self-serving biases 729 
(Shepperd et al., 2008), shyness or social referencing (DiMenichi & Tricomi, 2018), or strategic 730 
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displacement of responsibility (Bandura, 2002). Moreover, social contexts can objectively reduce 731 
control over one’s actions and outcomes, and can introduce ambiguity in who caused a given 732 
outcome. Perceived control is an important prerequisite for responsibility: one should reasonably 733 
assume more responsibility for a controllable event than for a non-controllable one. We show that 734 
the presence of others affects the human experience of voluntary action, even when alternative 735 
influences as the ones above are experimentally controlled for.  736 
 737 
In reference to the possible relation between a self-serving bias and diffusion of responsibility 738 
described in the introduction, we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that the diffusion 739 
of responsibility effect is specifically tied to a self-serving bias, such that participants 740 
strategically displace responsibility to others for undesirable outcomes, as exemplified in H1 741 
(figure 3). The second experiment showed a similar reduction in agency ratings in the alleged 742 
presence of a co-player, relative to playing alone, i.e. diffusion of responsibility, regardless of 743 
whether participants aimed to earn points (gain frame) or avoid losing points (loss frame). 744 
Turning to how agency ratings were affected by relatively more desirable vs. more undesirable 745 
outcomes (i.e. within-participants), our findings are consistent with a general self-serving bias, as 746 
participants report greater control over better outcomes, but that cannot explain the reduced sense 747 
of control in social contexts. If anything, the interaction pattern observed here was of a greater 748 
effect of social context on the sense of control with relatively better outcomes, consistent with the 749 
pattern of H3 (figure 3). Yet, we suggest this pattern is best explained by a floor effect on ratings 750 
for the more undesirable outcomes, which would overshadow the social context effect. When 751 
considered together with our previous studies (Beyer et al., 2017, 2018; Ciardo et al., 2020) 752 
consistenly showing no interactions between outcome value and social context, as depicted in H2 753 
(figure 3), we believe the balance of evidence is most consistent with the hypothesis that the 754 
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sense of agency is independently influenced by a self-serving bias, reflected in the effect of 755 
outcome, and the diffusion of responsibility seen in social contexts. 756 
 757 
Further supporting a dissociation between the effect on sense of agency of social context and of 758 
outcome value, higher sense of agency for better outcomes was even observed in a completely 759 
non-social task setup (when participants interacted with a pump, Exp 1). Moreover, studies using 760 
implicit measures of sense of agency in non-social settings (Christensen et al., 2016; Takahata et 761 
al., 2012)  have shown a consistent pattern of results, suggesting that this effect does not require 762 
explicit, reflective processes. The observed effect of outcome on sense of agency is consistent 763 
with a general self-serving bias, such that participants accept more control over actions with more 764 
desirable consequences. Yet, a second explanation worth noting would be that participants aimed 765 
to achieve the best outcome possible, and thus felt most in control when the observed outcome 766 
closely matched that intention.  767 
 768 
Together, the two experiments presented here provide strong support for our model of social 769 
context influences on sense of agency, developed in earlier studies (Beyer et al., 2017, 2018). 770 
According to this model, the presence of others increases dysfluency in the decision-making 771 
process, by evoking mentalizing processes in addition to task-directed cognition. This dysfluency 772 
then decreases sense of agency, in line with studies demonstrating reduced sense of agency with 773 
increased decision-making difficulty (Chambon et al., 2014; Sidarus et al., 2017b; Sidarus & 774 
Haggard, 2016; Wenke et al., 2010) or increased working memory demands (Hon et al., 2013; 775 




We propose that the presence of another human agent is a particularly strong source of 778 
dysfluency, due to the complexity of cognitive processes induced by their presence. Recall that, 779 
in the first experiment comparing social and non-social agents, participants in both groups 780 
experienced the same amount of external influence in the task, that is, the balloon was stopped by 781 
the alternative agent (co-player or faulty pump) in the same number of trials. Yet, the presence of 782 
another potential agent only influenced sense of agency when the agent was believed to be a 783 
social, intentional entity, compared to a non-living, presumably random one. Since the only 784 
difference between groups was the framing of the task, differences in the effects of context on 785 
sense of agency between groups likely depend on the cognitive processes associated with the two 786 
task versions. Given that the key difference was whether or not the task instructions involved 787 
another person, mentalizing processes are the most plausible cognitive process to differ between 788 
groups, as is supported by our previous MRI study (Beyer et al., 2018). Plausibly, people try to 789 
build a model of the other putative social agent’s behaviour in order to predict what the other 790 
agent will do. Mentalizing about their co-player's potential behaviour, and trying to predict when 791 
and why the co-player might act, would thus serve to help the participant try to avoid the cost of 792 
acting themselves. In contrast, participants in the non-social condition were less influenced by 793 
their previous experience of the faulty pump, and tended to ignore the influence of the pump 794 
during decision-making. This may be because participants could not, or did not expect to, form a 795 
predictive model of the pump’s relevant behaviour. When the potential alternative cause of the 796 
balloon stopping was non-social (i.e. the "old pump"), it might seem a priori less predictable, 797 
hence, participants might not engage resources in trying to understand its behaviour.  798 
In fact, similar effects have recently been found for interactions with a robot (Ciardo et al., 2020), 799 
in a task setting that did not involve monetary payoff, further suggesting that the perception of 800 
intentionality (as suggested even by an inanimate, but interactive robot) is sufficient to induce a 801 
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reduction in sense of agency. Taking these findings together thus supports our account that 802 
assuming an intentional stance towards the social agent results in continuous efforts at modelling 803 
and predicting their behaviour. Attempting to form this additional predictive model in turn 804 
disrupts the participant’s own decision-making and sense of agency.  805 
 806 
Our interpretation of our findings as supporting a critical role for mentalizing in interfering with 807 
decision-making is further supported by the observation that participants' decisions were indeed 808 
different in social contexts. Participants relied more on the alternative social agent to act, even to 809 
their own disadvantage, as it resulted in more trials in which the balloon popped. This suggests 810 
that in addition to deciding when to stop the balloon on a given trial, in the presence of a social 811 
agent, participants may have additionally considered whether they should act at all. This decision 812 
would depend on their prediction of the co-player’s behaviour. The non-social cause of "action" 813 
still increased uncertainty about what might happen in each trial, as the balloon might still stop 814 
"on its own". However, participants acted more frequently in this condition, experiencing fewer 815 
balloon burst. Thus, only social agents led to robust changes in the participants' decision-making 816 
processes, by considering the other's behaviour, in turn disrupting their sense of agency. In line 817 
with this, inter-individual differences in perspective taking have been related to susceptibility to 818 
the bystander effect, with participants higher in perspective taking traits being more strongly 819 
affected by the presence of bystanders (Hortensius et al., 2016). 820 
 821 
Limitations and future directions 822 
Alternative explanations for our findings should also be considered. Especially when comparing 823 
the social vs. non-social task setups, it is possible that these tasks differed in terms of emotional 824 
processes, in addition to cognitive effects. For example, participants could have experienced 825 
40 
 
interaction with another person as competitive or provocative. Further, it is possible that a 826 
socioeconomic setting, in which one’s own losses contribute to a co-player’s gain, may affect 827 
sense of agency differently than a non-economic setting. However, the structure of the task and 828 
instructions were such that it could also be perceived as a collaborative, turn-taking game. While 829 
participants have the individual goal of maximising their own payoff, they also have the shared 830 
goal of preventing the balloon from bursting. In fact, as the co-player’s behaviour was rated as 831 
moderately fair, we consider it unlikely that the observed loss of agency in social settings is 832 
primarily due to socioeconomic trade-off considerations, or anger. 833 
While our core findings are in line with previous studies, the interaction between outcome 834 
magnitude and social context effects has not previously been found. We believe floor effects are 835 
the most likely reason for the absence of a social context effect in trials with relatively bad 836 
outcomes. Nonetheless, it remains possible that deciding to act early could have altered the effect 837 
of social context on sense of agency, which could be explored in future studies. In the current 838 
task, response times were partially related to outcome magnitude, rendering it difficult to estimate 839 
the potentially specific role of response time on the effect of social context on sense of agency. 840 
However, the task was designed such that the speed at which the balloon inflated varied both 841 
across and within trials, ensuring that was no strict relationship between response time and 842 
outcome magnitude. Notably, there was no strong and consistent effect of social context on 843 
response times. Therefore, we do not think this is likely to be a significant confound for the 844 
effects observed here. 845 
Further, we mostly tested female participants here. However, in a previous study with a balanced 846 




It remains to be tested whether this agency-reducing effect of social context depends on the 849 
nature of the interaction. In the present experiment, the interaction was semi-competitive. In 850 
situations where participants engage in a fully shared goal (e.g. joint action setups), or in which a 851 
clear rule-based strategy is offered (such as prescribed turn-taking), the effect of the other’s 852 
presence on sense of agency might be absent or even reversed (cf. van der Wel, 2015).   853 
Relatedly, future studies could further address the potential role of perceived uncertainty of the 854 
alternative agent, as this may have differed between the social and non-social task groups in 855 
experiment 1. One possibility is manipulating the predictability of the co-player’s behaviour, to 856 
assess whether a more random behavioural pattern affects sense of agency differently than a more 857 
strategic or predictable one. 858 
 859 
Sense of agency is related to a number of perceptual processes (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and 860 
outcome monitoring (Bednark & Franz, 2014), and is thus presumed to play a crucial role in 861 
voluntary action. Previous research has largely focused on the benefits of social contexts to 862 
human cognition (Devaine et al., 2014; Vanlangendonck et al., 2018). This has neglected its 863 
potentially disruptive effects under some circumstances, as when social context reduces sense of 864 
agency and outcome monitoring (Beyer et al., 2017). Our findings have strong implications for 865 
common educational practices: reduced sense of agency in social contexts may likely affect 866 
feedback-driven learning, making a case for reduced peer influence on individual learning 867 
processes. Moreover, future studies should take into account interpersonal variability in the 868 
sensitivity to social cues, to better understand the role of mentalizing processes in learning from 869 





In the presence of other people, mentalizing processes can interfere with non-social aspects of 873 
human cognition. In two experiments, we show that the presence of others reduces sense of 874 
agency over gain and loss outcomes, and that this effect is specific to the presence of an 875 
intentional, social agent. Our findings suggest that the presence of other people can have 876 
fundamental effects on how we perceive our own actions and outcomes. This has important 877 
implications for our understanding of human behaviour in social environments. Even without an 878 
explicit motivation for self-serving displacement of responsibility, the presence of others can 879 
affect our subjective sense of agency. An anticipated lack of control might reduce an individual’s 880 
motivation to take action in a social situation, while reduced outcome monitoring could be linked 881 
to reduced learning from action consequences. Thus, further studies should focus on the effects 882 
that a reduced sense of agency in social situations might have on subsequent learning and 883 
decision-making. 884 
 885 
Open Practices 886 
Data is available in de-identified form on Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/2s7kb/).887 
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